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**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

2025:PHHC:117014



CRM-M-40068-2025 (O&M)
Date of decision: 29.08.2025.

MANMOHITPAL SINGH AND OTHERS

...Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER

...Respondent(s)

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD S. BHARDWAJ

Present :- Mr. Shubham Kaushik, Advocate,
for the petitioners.

Mr. Mohit Kapoor, Sr. DAG, Punjab.

Mr. Vishnu Dutt, Advocate, for
Mr. Naveen Bawa, Advocate,
for respondent No.2.

VINOD S. BHARDWAJ, J. (Oral)

By means of the instant petition, the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, (hereinafter referred to 'BNSS 2023') (erstwhile Section 482 Cr.P.C.) has been invoked for seeking quashing of FIR No.0238 dated 28.11.2024 under Section(s) 304 (2), 115 (2), 126 (2), 351 (2), 324 (4), 191 (3) and 190 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (hereafter to be referred as 'BNS 2023') registered at Police Station Division No.6 Ludhiana and all other

consequential proceedings arising therefrom, on the basis of compromise dated 11.01.2025 entered between the parties.

2 The parties were directed to appear before the learned trial Court/Illaq Magistrate vide order dated 28.07.2025 of this Court, to get their statements recorded regarding the compromise arrived at between the parties and a report in this regard was called for.

3 Pursuant to the said order, report has been received from the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ludhiana, vide Memo No.156 dated 06.08.2025. The relevant extract of the report is reproduced as under:-

“As per the statement of complainant and accused persons recorded by the undersigned, all of them have echoed the version of having arrived at voluntary compromise with free will without any pressure, coercion or undue influence. Complainant even made statement that compromise is voluntarily and without any inducement, threat pressure or coercion and there is no grudge against the accused party and he has no objection if FIR in question is quashed by Hon'ble High Court The original statements of the parties recorded by the undersigned are being sent herewith.

The accused Manmohit Pal Singh, Rohit Rathor and Suraj Rathor also mentioned in their statement that accused has entered into compromise with the complainant has been executed without any force. threat or coercion. There is no other FIR registered against them and they have not been declared proclaimed offender in any case till date and there is no other complaint or aggrieved party in the present case.

Even investigating officer ASI Dilbagh Singh was also summoned by the court, who appeared in the Court on 04.08.2025 and gave a separate statement that there is no other accused other than the petitioner arrayed in this petition and

there is no other complainant or affected party other than the respondents as arrayed in the petition and none of the accused are proclaimed offender in the present case and no other criminal case is pending against the accused persons.

On the basis of statements made by the parties appearing before me, the compromise on the face of it appears to be genuine one having been arrived at by the parties with free will without any pressure or coercion. There is nothing on the record to doubt the genuineness of the compromise so arrived at between the parties. Report is submitted before i.e. 29.08.2025.

With these submissions, the report with regard to the compromise is being submitted.”

4 Learned State counsel does not dispute the factum of the compromise amongst the parties and does not have any serious objection to the resolution of the dispute amongst the parties.

5 Mr. Vishnu Dutt, Advocate, for Mr. Naveen Bawa, Advocate, appears on behalf of respondent No.2 and reiterates the settlement and his concurrence to the FIR and all the other consequential proceedings being quashed.

6 The Full Bench of this Court in the matter of “**Kulwinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another**” reported as **(Punjab and Haryana High Court) : 2007 (3) RCR (Criminal) 1052** has observed as under:

'(28) To conclude, it can safely be said that there can never be any hard and fast category which can be prescribed to enable the Court to exercise its power under [Section 482](#) of the Cr.P.C. The only principle that can be laid down is the one which has been incorporated in the Section itself, i.e., "to prevent abuse of

the process of any Court" or "to secure the ends of justice".

(29) In Mrs. Shakuntala Sawhney v. Mrs. Kaushalya Sawhney and Ors., Hon'ble Krishna Iyer, J. aptly summoned up the essence of compromise in the following words:

"The finest hour of justice arrives propitiously when parties, despite falling apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship of reunion."

(30) The power to do complete justice is the very essence of every judicial justice dispensation system. It cannot be diluted by distorted perceptions and is not a slave to anything, except to the caution and circumspection, the standards of which the Court sets before it, in exercise of such plenary and unfettered power inherently vested in it while donning the cloak of compassion to achieve the ends of justice.

(31) No embargo, be in the shape of Section 320(9) of the Cr.P.C., or any other such curtailment, can whittle down the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

(32) The compromise, in a modern society, is the sine qua non of harmony and orderly behaviour. It is the soul of justice and if the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is used to enhance such a compromise which, in turn, enhances the social amity and reduces friction, then it truly is "finest hour of justice". Disputes which have their genesis in a matrimonial discord, landlord-tenant matters, commercial transactions and other such matters can safely be dealt with by the Court by exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in the event of a compromise, but this is not to say that the power is limited to such cases. There can never be any such rigid rule to prescribe the exercise of such power, especially in the absence of any premonitions to forecast and predict eventualities which the cause of justice may throw up during the course of a litigation.

(33) The only inevitable conclusion from the above discussion is that there is no statutory bar under the Cr.P.C. which can affect the inherent power of this Court under Section 482. Further, the

same cannot be limited to matrimonial cases alone and the Court has the wide power to quash the proceedings even in non-compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C., in order to prevent the abuse of law and to secure the ends of justice.

(34) The power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is to be exercised Ex-Debitia Justitia to prevent an abuse of process of Court. There can neither be an exhaustive list nor the defined para-meters to enable a High Court to invoke or exercise its inherent powers. It will always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has no limits. However, the High Court will exercise it sparingly and with utmost care and caution. The exercise of power has to be with circumspection and restraint. The Court is a vital and an extra-ordinary effective instrument to maintain and control social order. The Courts play role of paramount importance in achieving peace, harmony and ever-lasting congeniality in society. Resolution of a dispute by way of a compromise between two warring groups, therefore, should attract the immediate and prompt attention of a Court which should endeavour to give full effect to the same unless such compromise is abhorrent to lawful composition of the society or would promote savagery.”

7 The legal principles as laid down for quashing of the judgment were also approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of **'Gian Singh Versus State of Punjab and another,(2012) 10 SCC 303'**. Furthermore, the broad principles for exercising the powers under Section 482 were summarized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of **'Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others versus State of Gujarat and another” (2017) 9 SCC 641'**.

8 It is evident that in view of the amicable resolution of the issues amongst the parties, no useful purpose would be served by continuation of the proceedings. The furtherance of the proceedings is likely to be a waste of judicial time and there appears to be no chances of conviction.

9 The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the matter of 'Ramgopal And Another Vs State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC Online SC 834', that the matters which can be categorized as personal in nature or in the matter in which the nature of injuries do not exhibit mental depravity or commission of an offence of such a serious nature that quashing of which would override public interest, the Court can quash the FIR in view of the settlement arrived at amongst the parties. The observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is extracted as under:-

“19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences ‘compoundable’ within the statutory framework, the extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.”

10 The following relevant factors emerge from perusal of the case

as well as the subsequent developments supplementing a case for invocation of the powers under Section 528 BNSS: -

(i) The dispute is arising from a roadside scuffle between the parties.

(ii) The petitioners are in their twenties and continuation of criminal proceedings will cause severe repercussions to the petitioner in discharge of their social obligations as well as at their workplace.

(iii) The petitioner is a lawyer and the accused is also brother of a practicing lawyer.

(iv) The witness of the incident himself is a lawyer.

(v) The case is still at the initial stage as the FIR was registered in November 2024.

(vi) The offence in question cannot be said to be heinous or as an offence that would be shocking to the conscience of the society or public at large. It can also not be termed as one shocking to the conscience of the Court;

(vii) Continuation of the proceedings and forcing the parties to undergo rigours of criminal proceedings is not likely to subserve any large public interest;

(viii) The proceedings are likely to end in futility for want of parties to support the case of the prosecution;

(ix) No larger public purpose would be served by continuation of the proceedings;

(x) Parties do not suffer any criminal antecedents and have not

indulged in any such or similar case during the pendency of the case or after registration of the FIR.

(xi) Continuation of the proceedings is likely to be a waste of judicial time. The object of law is well served when the parties resolve their differences and choose to peacefully co-exist and live in harmony.

11 In view of the report of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ludhiana, and the principles laid down by the Apex Court in **Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and others (2012) 10 SCC 303**, as well as **Ramgopal And Another Vs State of Madhya Pradesh 2021 SCC Online SC 834** and also by the Full Bench of this Court in **Kulwinder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and another, 2007(3) RCR (Criminal) 1052**, the instant petition is allowed. The aforesaid FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom, are hereby quashed qua the petitioner(s) in view of compromise dated 11.01.2025 (Annexure P-3) entered between the parties. However, the same would be subject to payment of costs of Rs.5000/- each to be deposited by the petitioner(s) with the District Legal Services Authority, Ludhiana, within two months from receipt of certified copy of this order.

12 Petition is allowed.

13 It has been noticed that description of the respondent-State has been wrongly mentioned in the memo of parties as '**State of Haryana**' instead of '**State of Punjab.**' The Registry is thus directed to carry out the

correction accordingly.

August 29, 2025.
raj arora

(VINOD S. BHARDWAJ)
JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned : *Yes/No*
Whether reportable : *Yes/No*